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Abstract—The proliferation of the Internet of Things (IoTs)
and pervasive use of many different types of mobile computing
devices make wireless communication spectrum a precious re-
source. In order to accommodate the still fast increasing number
of devices requesting wireless connection, more efficient, fine-
grained spectrum allocation and sharing schemes are badly
in need. Cognitive radio networks (CRNs) have been widely
recognized as one promising solution, in which the secondary
users (SUs) are allowed to share channels with licensed primary
users (PUs) as long as bringing no interference to the normal
operations of the PUs. However, malicious attackers or selfish
SUs may mimic the behavior of PUs to occupy the channels
illegally. It is nontrivial to accurately, timely detect such kind of
primary user emulation (PUE) attacks. In this paper, an efficient
PUE attacked detection method is introduced leveraging the
recurrent neural network (RNN). After a fundamental algorithm
using basic RNN, an advanced version taking advantage of
long-short-term-memory (LSTM) is proposed, which is more
efficient on processing time series with long term memory.
The experimental study has provided deeper insights about the
different performances the RNNs achieved and validated the
effectiveness of the proposed detectors.
Index Terms—Cognitive Radio Networks (CRNs), Primary
User Emulation (PUE) Attacks, Recurrent Neural Network
(RNN), Long-Short-Term-Memory (LSTM).
I. INTRODUCTION
The rigid spectrum allocation scheme regulated by gov-
ernmental agencies leads to great deficit on spectrum band
resources. Under the current policies, wireless channels are as-
signed to fixed users for exclusive use. Such a static spectrum
access technology results in a low efficient utility of wireless
spectrum resources due to the fact that the frequency bands are
scarcely used with geographical discrepancy. The emergence
of new intelligent spectrum allocation/re-allocation schemes,
especially cognitive radio networks (CRNs), are studied elab-
orately in the last decade, under the growing pressure from the
ever-increasing wireless applications. Cognitive radio (CR),
or known as secondary user (SU) in CRNs, is a technology
that allows wireless devices (unlicensed users) access spectrum
resources adaptively without introducing major interference to
licensed primary users (PUs).
Basically, a well-designed CRN aims to serve for two pur-
poses [2]: to maximize the usage of spare spectrum resource
as well as to protect the incumbent primary system from
secondary network interference. Since it is required to SUs
that they shall not interfere the normal operations of the PU
functionalities, SUs should adapt their behavior in accordance
to PU activities. In most cases, knowing PU activities is
essentially critical for cognitive radios to share the spectrum
resource with legitimate users. One of the effortless ways
to acquire PU activity information is that PUs are able to
notify SUs their spectrum usage status; or there exist a third
party as an inquiry center that knows what PUs will do in
the near future. An alternative solution, which is the widely
accepted one, is to develop robust and efficient spectrum
sensing technique to acquire knowledge on PU activities.
Spectrum sensing allows CRs acquire real-time spectrum
occupation information such that interweaving communica-
tions shared by PUs and SUs become feasible. Generally,
spectrum sensing requires CRN participators to scan the
desired spectrum band in a proper manner. In many CRN
deployment models, especially interweave model, spectrum
sensing is one of the most important procedure on exploring
white spectrum space for use while imposing little interference
to PUs [3]. Because of the limited computational capacity and
energy resources of SUs, in many recent spectrum sensing
and spectrum measurement studies, researchers had conducted
intensive discussions on many practical implementations, such
as sensing complexity, power consumption, sensing period,
and so on [4].
In practical CRN implementations, one of the major chal-
lenges of spectrum sensing is to detect PU signals with high
accuracy while maintaining a low false alarm rate in the open
and versatile radio environment, with limited SU resources.
Also, the spectrum sharing efficiency greatly depends on a
secure CR operating environment. In interweave spectrum
sharing models, due to the opportunistic spectrum access
(OSA) nature, CR systems encounter several CR-specified se-
curity problems. In contaminated radio environments, the false
detection rate of spectrum sensing may become extraordinarily
high, especially when a primary user emulation (PUE) attack
happens. A PUE attack is that the malicious entities mimic PU
signals in order to either occupy spectrum resource selfishly or
conduct Denial of Service (DoS) attacks. PUE attacks can be
easily implemented in CRNs. It introduces great overhead on
cognitive radio communication and causes chaos in dynamic
spectrum sensing. However, defense against the PUE attacks is
nontrivial as traditional authentication and authorization (AA)
methods are no longer applicable to CR systems, because
no obligation should be imposed on PUs. More adaptive and
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practical PUE attack detection techniques are highly desired.
In general, PUE attack detection techniques are divided into
two broad categories: fingerprint/radiometric based detection
and activity pattern based detection. For the first category, the
detection methods usually probe either a). the transmitter’s
intrinsic features such as pulse shape [16], transient [20],
b). the propagation channel features [15], or c). geographical
informations [8]. These fingerprint/radiometric based detection
approaches all have restricted deployment due to particular
limitations. For example, detection transmitter features are
usually computing intensive, and some features are prone to
be overwhelmed over long distance propagation. In addition,
propagation channels are usually not static, and sometimes
suffer from great fluctuation over short distances [6]. Also,
geographical feature based detections usually require some
critical prior informations, such as sensing nodes’ location,
PU propagation power, and stable propagation channel [8].
Furthermore, they are likely influenced by mobile PUs [29].
On the other hand, activity pattern based methods have
been discussed in several literatures [11], [23], [24], [27].
The fundamental idea is based on the assumption that PUs’
activities can be generalized by some proper activity models
or a combinations of a set of proper hyperplanes. When mali-
cious nodes conduct PUE attacks, the sensed signal activities
will show noticeable discrepancy from normal PU behaviors
in compromised spectrum channels. Since attackers will in-
evitably generate excessive signal activities, activity pattern
based detection methods are promising for development, due
to the low computation burden and flexible deployment.
In most of the activity pattern based PUE attack detection
studies, an un-intermittent spectrum scanning manner is as-
sumed for each sensing SU, although intermittent spectrum
sensing schemes are preferable in recently spectrum sensing
studies, in seek of energy efficiency and processing efficiency
[4], [9], [28]. In intermittent spectrum sensing, the sensing
nodes scan the desired channel with a proper observation
period to maintain a reasonable Resolution Bandwidth (RBW),
and then sit back for a sensing interval to preserve energy and
computation resource. Such kind of spectrum sensing schemes
only allow CRN to obtain partial channel information, which
brings great difficulties on detection of activity patterns.
When explore signal activity patterns, it is reasonable to
assume that there are some “features” inherited into signal
sequence. On the other hand, with an intermittent spectrum
sensing, the channel status is not independent to previous
status. Thus, the signal activity patterns can be regarded as
the possible sequence which relates to some “features” of
the channel and the previous internal states (memory). In
this work, we proposed a recurrent neural network (RNN)
based PUE attack detection method leveraging the energy-
and-computation-efficient intermittent spectrum sensing tech-
nology. Further, a more advanced RNN techniques, called long
short-term memory (LSTM), is studied for the detection.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section II
provides the background knowledge that motivated this work,
it also discusses some related work on state-of-art spectrum
Fig. 1. Practical CR spectrum sensing pattern.
sensing techniques and PUE attack detection approaches.
Section III presents a practical PU activity model and briefly
introduces the PUE attack detection process. The proposed
RNN-based and LSTM-based PUE attack detection methods
are introduced in Section IV. Section V reports our experimen-
tal evaluation on three different PUE attack detectors in two
PU activity models. Finally, Section VI concludes this paper
along with a brief discussion about our on-going efforts.
II. RELATED WORK
It is proven by many spectrum measurement campaigns
around the world that the spectrum occupancy of PU channels
shows noticeable statistic features, which can be described by
some statistical models [7]. Figure 1 shows a rational and
practical way for spectrum sensing, which allows CRs measure
a channel’s state during a short observation time Tob and wait
for a revisiting time Tre until next spectrum sensing action.
Based on such an intermittent spectrum sensing manner, there
are two ways to improve the efficiency of CRNs. The CRs can
either save energy during Tre period of sleep, or they are able
to perform wideband spectrum sensing by sensing other bands
during Tre period of scanning. However, because CRs only
collect intermittent channel information, many signal patterns
become untraceable. It is more advantageous for malicious
parties to apply various attacks, especially the PUE attacks.
In CR systems, since no obligation is imposed on PUs
according to Federal Communications Commission (FCC) [1],
it is necessary to distinguish attacker signals from PU signals
while SUs actively sense the channel. Otherwise, PUE attacks
will cause severe problems on the efficiency of spectrum
utility [12]. As discussed before, in PUE attack detection, the
fingerprint/radiometric based detection methods have restricted
deployment, because they are either resource intensive, or only
applicable under certain conditions. In comparison, activity
pattern based detection methods attract more attention in
broader application scenarios.
Some literatures have explored different ways using activity
pattern for PUE attack detection. One of the recent work
explored a cooperative spectrum sensing method on detection
of PUE attack [24]. The author considered the most common
spectrum sensing approach, energy detection, and find the
optimal detection threshold of the aggregated sensing samples
from all CRs by using numerical method. The proposed
approach is easy to be implemented for its low cost, and
it is also compatible to practical spectrum sensing process.
However, the proposal is weak in several aspects: a) to find
the optimal detection threshold, the prior probabilities of attack
are assumed known; b) the sensed samples are assumed to
follow the Gaussian distribution, which is not proven; and c)
the attackers in the model are assumed too passive to adjust
their behavior, such as attack strength, attack probability and
attack timing. As a matter of fact, a smart attacker will easily
deceive such detector.
In 2014, a signal activity pattern (SAP) based PUE attack
detection method was proposed [27]. The main idea is that the
PU signal activities can be well reconstructed by some sparse
combination of a set of feature vector bases, while attack
activities can not be sparsely reconstructed by such bases.
Besides a lengthy training process, the proposal may suffer
from two practical issues. Firstly, it requires a consecutive
long enough observation duration to preserve ON/OFF features
of the signal activities (30 ON/OFF periods in the literature).
Secondly, it is expensive to find an optimal solution of the sig-
nal reconstruction problem by solving a convex optimization
problem for each detection, which consumes a great amount
of resources. Although the proposed SAP based PUE attack
detection is theoretically sound, it is not advantageous in
practical implementation.
Detection of PUE attacks greatly depends on the spectrum
sensing manner. As discussed in many literatures, an efficient
spectrum sensing method usually leverages only a short obser-
vation time on collecting signal samples [9], [10], [17], [28].
The basis to find optimal spectrum sensing interval in CRN
is that PU activities usually follow some activity models [7],
[14], [22]. In most of such activity models, each user request
arrival is assumed independent, thus the state holding time
or sojourn time is modeled as exponentially distributed [21],
[28]. However, in practice, it was found that more complex
distribution models are needed to better describe the state
holding times, such as means of generalized Pareto or Hyper-
Erlang distributions [13], [19].
To model a PU activity in spectrum sensing, various Markov
models are preferably in many studies. A comprehensive study
of the PU activity modeling by using first order Markov
models can be found in [22]. Although the first order Markov
models may perform well for simple PU activity models,
say exponentially distributed model, they are not adequate
to model complicated, real-world PU activity models. Other
studies, inspired by the great capability of artificial neural
networks, made some trials on modeling PU activities using
different neural networks (NN). For example, a plain feed-
forward neural network (FNN) was used for spectrum predic-
tion in [26]. A simple FNN shows some merits on predicting
spectrum status, but it omits one important fact. Similar to
the first order Markov models, the next channel states are not
only related to the current states, but also related to a possibly
longer history of channel states. Recently, a trial by using
a recurrent neural network (RNN) to predict spectrum slots
is proposed [25]. A RNN is a neural network structure that
makes use of sequential information by using its “memory”
of previous states. It is naturally efficient on modeling the
Fig. 2. Short impulse PUE attack in CRN which uses intermittent spectrum
sensing.
Fig. 3. Two-state ON/OFF PU activity model.
patterns of temporal dependency of time series [30].
While using the intermittent spectrum sensing approach,
some critical PU activities information will get lost, such as
channel holding time by PU. As a result, a smart attacker is
able to conduct short impulse denial-of-service (DoS) attack to
cause intensive PUE attacks as shown in Fig. 2. To overcome
the partial information problem, in our proposal, we will
explore the “memory” feature of the RNN to model the PU
signal patterns of a spectrum channel, by which to detect the
PUE attack in such channel.
III. SYSTEM MODEL
In CRNs, the typical OSA is usually conducted by the
following four steps:
1) apply spectrum sensing and analysis on wide spectrum
band, and determine the proper bands for secondary use;
2) access a proper spectrum band for propagation while it
is in idle state;
3) apply intermittent spectrum sensing for consistent spec-
trum band monitoring, to avoid causing severe interfer-
ence to PUs; and
4) switch to another proper spectrum band if current band
is occupied.
As illustrated in Fig. 1, the PU activity in a channel can
be described with a two-state ON/OFF model. In Fig. 3, p
denotes the transition probability from ON state to OFF state,
and q denotes the transition probability from OFF state to ON
state. Ton stands for the sojourn time in ON state and Toff
denotes the OFF duration. The probability density functions
(p.d.f) of Ton and Toff are denoted as fTon(t) and fToff (t),
respectively.
For SUs using intermittent spectrum sensing, as discussed
in previous section, CRs measure a channel’s state during
a short observation time Tob and wait for a revisiting time
Tre until next spectrum sensing action. During Tre, the SU
can either put itself to sleep or sense other spectrum bands.
One major problem with intermittent spectrum sensing is that
the observation only reflects partial spectrum information. It
senses ON or OFF at certain period, but missing some other
critical information of the PU signals, such as the starting and
ending moment of the ON and OFF period, and the exact
length of ON and OFF period. Such an incomplete spectrum
sensing measure makes it harder to detect malicious activities,
especially the PUE attacks.
Fortunately, the PU activities are not totally random. It pre-
serve some patterns and features. The involvement of the PUE
attacks will inevitably introduce some “other” features. If we
are able to learn the PU activity patterns from initial spectrum
sensing and analysis stage, it is possible to distinguish exotic
PUE activities from normal PU activities. We assume the PU
ON/OFF activities follow Hyper-Erlang distributions, which
have been proven as an effective PU activity model [13]. It
is worthy to note that in practical spectrum prediction and
abnormal detection, the PU activity model is unknown, and
may follow other distributions. We will not make any strong
assumptions about PU activity model’s distribution function
in our detection process. It means that we will not use the
assumed Hyper-Erlang distribution model in our detection
models. Instead, the Hyper-Erlang distribution model is used to
simulate actual PU activities, where the fTon(t) and fToff (t)
are defined as :
fTon(t) =
n∑
i=1
pon,i · t
(kon,i−1)exp(−t/θon,i)
θ
kon,i
on,i (kon,i − 1)!
(1)
fToff (t) =
n∑
i=1
poff,i · t
(koff,i−1)exp(−t/θoff,i)
θ
koff,i
off,i (koff,i − 1)!
(2)
where pon,i, poff,i ∈ R and
∑n
i=1 pon,i = 1,
∑n
i=1 poff,i = 1,
kon,i, koff,i ∈ N are shape parameters, θon,i, θoff,i ∈ R are
scale parameters.
The expectations of Ton and Toff can be computed by:
E(Ton) =
n∑
i=1
pon,i · kon,i · θon,i (3)
E(Toff ) =
n∑
i=1
poff,i · koff,i · θoff,i (4)
In our detection model, the PUE attack detection process is
briefly described in four steps:
1) The SUs will follow the typical OSA intermittent spec-
trum sensing process by first determining an appropriate
spectrum channel by collecting a sensed time sequence
X = {x(1), x(2), · · · , x(n−1), x(n)}, where it is com-
posed by 1′s and 0′s; the 1 represents busy state of the
channel, and 0 represents idle state of the channel;
2) Based on the sequence X , SUs can learn the signal
activity patterns of the channel to construct a PUE attack
detector D;
3) While sharing the channel with PUs, SUs shall still
apply intermittent spectrum sensing with the same
manner to generate testing time sequence S =
{s(1), s(2), · · · , s(n−1), s(n), · · · }, in order to avoid in-
terference with PUs and to detect malicious signal
activities; and
4) Use the current state series s◦ =
{s(t−lI), s(t−lI+1), · · · , s(t−1), s(t)} with length
lI as the detector D’s input, and compare
the output series y with the next state series
s∗ = {s(t′−lC), s(t′−lC+1), · · · , s(t′−1), s(t′)} with
length lC to determine the abnormity.
IV. RNN BASED DETECTION
For activity pattern based PUE attack detection, the essential
rationale is to extract or model the patterns of the normal
signal traffic. With partial information series generated by
intermittent spectrum sensing, the general idea of the detection
becomes to determine whether or not the received series falls
into the normal series set. Since the attacker can produce
various PUE attacks, it is hard to define the attacker behavior,
i.e. abnormal series set. A dilemma in such a situation is that
it is not practical to construct a normal series set based on
discrete sensing series whereas lacking of abnormal signal
patterns. Because the longer series we use to construct the
normal series set, the better to include more comprehensive
normal behavior series in the set, while exclude the possible
abnormal behavior series. The problems is, however, it will
cause the constructed normal series set grows exponentially
as the length of series grows. Another problem is that even if
we can construct a normal series set, it still omits the internal
connection between series states. For example, some behaviors
of the series might be considered normal in some situations,
while they are actually abnormal in different context.
Thus, traditional approaches such as the signal decomposi-
tion, i.e. principal component analysis (PCA), or traditional
classification techniques, i.e. vector machines and logistic
regression, are not adequate to resolve PUE attack detection
problem in this case. A more appropriate approach is to
identify a relatively small normal series set, given a long
history of previous behavior of series. For different history
of series, the normal set shall change in a proper way.
Therefore, a appropriate PUE attack detector with intermittent
spectrum sensing should be: 1) not computational and memory
expensive; 2) effective to preserve the PU activity patterns
without any prior model information; and 3) normal pattern
behavior is adaptive to a long history of behavior by seeking
temporal domain information.
A. RNN-based PUE Attack Detector
Recurrent neural network (RNN), a feed-forward neural
network (FNN) with decoupling temporal relationships and
information, is a promising technique for the PUE attack
Fig. 4. A simple feedforward neural network.
detection. Similar to FNNs, the RNN is benefited from the
adaptive structure that is able to model some complex nonlin-
ear functions. In addition, RNN not only learns the network
structure to fit the series model, but also preserve it cell states,
which is comparable to the “memory” of the series while
detecting. The current “memory” will be used along with the
input series to predict the next step states.
Figures 4 and 5 show the different architectures of the basic
FNN and RNN. In a FNN, the network only uses current
time series to generate the output. The actual information
used by the network only depends on the length of the input.
It is problematic in series prediction, specifically in PUE
attack detection. Because such a network structure generates
uncertainty of which portion of the input information is
more important and which portion is relatively trivial. Also
it requires a large data set for training, since the input length
is required to be sufficiently long. The RNN, on the other
hand, not only uses current input series information, but
also uses its memory of earlier time series in a recurrent
way. Given a input series S = {s◦1, s◦2, · · · , s◦T }, the RNN
computes the hidden state sequence H = {h1,h2, · · · ,hT },
as well as the output sequence Y = {y1,y2, · · · ,yT }
iteratively using the following set of equations, where s◦i =
{s(ti−li), s(ti−li+1), · · · , s(ti−1), s(ti)} with length lI , hi =
{h(1), h(2), · · · , h(m)}, and yi = {y(1), y(2), · · · , y(lO)} with
length lO:
hi = f(W hxsi +W hhhi−1 + bh) (5)
yi = g(W yhhi + by) (6)
In Eq. 5 and Eq. 6, W hx is the matrix of conventional
weights between the input and the hidden layer, W hh is the
matrix of recurrent weights between the hidden layer and itself
at adjacent time steps, and W yh is the hidden-output weight
matrix. bh and by are bias of the hidden layer and the output
layer, respectively [18]. f is the activation function used in
the hidden layer, and g is the activation function used in the
output layer.
Fig. 5. A simple recurrent neural network that unfolded across time steps. At
each time step, the network uses both current input series and its cell states
to generate the output.
In CRNs, during the initial spectrum sensing stage, the
normal PU activity series can be used to train the RNN model
at either SUs side or at a fusion center if a non-distributed CRN
is adopted. While sharing the spectrum channel with PUs, the
SUs can constantly inspect the signal activity behaviors, by
applying the trained RNN as the PUE attack detector.
However, while training the RNN to learn PU activity pat-
terns, we actually do not use any series with PUE attacks. The
RNN can only learn the normal features. Thus, it is not able
to classify the incoming activity series as either PU activity or
attacker activity. We need to transform the trained RNN to an
efficient RNN based detector D. Since the RNN is modeling
the features of the series composed by 1′s and 0′s, the detector
is designed to detect the difference between the predicted
yi = {y(1), y(2), · · · , y(lO)} and the real received series s∗ =
{s(t′−lC), s(t′−lC+1), · · · , s(t′−1), s(t′)} with length lC , given
some input series s◦ = {s(t−lI), s(t−lI+1), · · · , s(t−1), s(t)}
with length lI and previous historical series. Actually, we
do not expect the trained RNN to predict the exact output
series. Instead, the series with length lC is mapped to a “label”
domain with 2lC elements. For example, a series with length
2 can be mapped to the “label” domain with 4 elements,
{[0, 0], [0, 1], [1, 0, ], [1, 1]}. The RNN is trained to predict the
likelihood of each different labels. Such that we are able to
map the actually received series s∗ to the element in the
“label” domain. Then compute the mean square error (MSE)
as the loss, by comparing predicted likelihoods of each labels
and the real received series:
Loss =
1
2lC
∑
i6=j
(y(i))
2 + (1− y(j))2 (7)
where j denotes the label corresponding to the received series,
y(i) denotes the output likelihood of label i.
B. LSTM based detector architecture
The basic RNN is not efficient in processing series with
long temporal dependency, due to the well known gradient
vanishing problem [5]. The gradient vanishing problem makes
RNN prone to forget long term information, which mean if
some pattern happens long before current input series, RNN
will not be able to use such pattern. In order to overcome this
Fig. 6. Structure of a Long Short-Term Memory cell.
shortcoming, several other recurrent network structures were
introduced. Long short-term memory (LSTM) is one of the
important developments of RNN, in which the ordinary node
in the hidden layer is replaced by a memory cell and several
gates, shown in Fig. 6. Each LSTM cell has two internal states:
hidden state and cell state. In our case, given a input series
s◦i , and previous hidden state hi, compute the forget gate f i
as:
f i = σ(W fss
◦
i +W fhhi−1 + bf ) (8)
The output of Eq. 8 is a matrix with elements between 0 and
1. It is used to decide what “memory” (cell state) is forgotten
and what is kept, where 1 means the memory is completely
kept, and 0 means the memory is totally forgotten. Further,
the input gate ii in Fig. 6 is computed as:
ii = σ(W iss
◦
i +W ihhi−1 + bi) (9)
The output of Eq. 9 is another matrix with elements between
0 and 1. It used to decide what input information should
be used to update the “memory” (cell state), where 1 stands
for using the entire input information, and 0 stands for not
using the input information. The LSTM will process the input
information gi as:
gi = tanh(W gss
◦
i +W ghhi−1 + bg) (10)
With computed hi, ii and gi, the new “memory” (cell state)
is updated as:
ci = f i  ci−1 ⊕ ii  gi (11)
where  means element-wise multiplication, and ⊕ means
element-wise addition. Another gate called output gate oi is
used to decide what information should be used in new cell
state as the output of this LSTM cell. The output gate oi is
computed as:
oi = σ(W oss
◦
i +W ohhi−1 + bo) (12)
The new hidden state as well as the output of this LSTM
is computed as:
TABLE I
PARAMETERS FOR SIMPLE PU ACTIVITY MODEL
Hyper-Erlang (ON) Hyper-Erlang (OFF)
p [0.5, 0.5] [0.5, 0.5]
k [1, 1] [2, 4]
θ [0.5, 1.5] [2, 1]
hi = tanh(ci) oi (13)
The hidden state of this LSTM cell, or the hidden state of
the last LSTM cell for multi-layer LSTM, is fed into another
activation function for final classification:
yi = h(W yhhi + by) (14)
where h is the activation function for classification. In Eq. 8
to 14, W fs,W fh,W is,W ih,W gs,W gh,W os,W oh,W yh
are weight matrices, and bf , bi, bg, bo, by are bias vectors.
By applying above techniques in LSTM cell, the LSTM
based PUE attack detector is theoretically more adaptive to
both long term and short term of PU activity patterns than
RNN based PUE attack detector.
In addition, the single layer LSTM can be extended with
deeper structures, such as multi-layer LSTM. Theoretically, a
multi-layer LSTM is able to learn more comprehensive PU
activity patterns.
V. EXPERIMENTAL STUDY
In this section, we will compare the performances of the
basic RNN based detector, the LSTM based detector and the
multi-layer LSTM based detector on PUE attack detections.
A. Evaluation using a simple PU activity model
We first evaluate the detectors performance using a rel-
atively simple Hyper-Erlang distribution to model the PU
activity. The parameters defined in Eq. 1 and Eq. 2 are shown
in Table I.
The expectation of Ton and Toff can be computed as 1
second and 4 seconds respectively. We tentatively used a
intermittent spectrum sensing interval Tre = 0.24 second and
observation time Tob = 0.01 second for spectrum sensing. In
the contaminated PU activity, the attacker will deploy short
impulse PUE attack with probability of 0.3 at any particular
time slot Tob.
Table II shows the loss of using different RNN on predicting
both normal series and abnormal series. The loss function is
defined in Eq. 7. The statistic shows that the average loss
on the attack series is much higher than the average loss on
normal series.
Figures 7, 8, and 9 provide a closer look at how does the loss
distributed, showing the loss distribution along a short period
of time steps. All three figure show that the prediction loss
on PUE attack contaminated series is almost always greater
than the prediction loss on normal series. While using the
contaminated series for prediction, on one hand, the output
is highly unpredictable because the input series pattern may
TABLE II
AVERAGE LOSS FOR DIFFERENT DETECTOR IN SIMPLE PU ACTIVITY
MODEL
Method Average loss for
normal series
Average loss for con-
taminated series
Basic RNN 0.0235 0.0538
Single layer LSTM 0.0491 0.0901
Three layer LSTM 0.0003 0.0477
Fig. 7. Sample of prediction loss using basic RNN in simple PU activity
case.
never be trained by the network; on the other hand, the
correlation between the input series and real received series
is obscure to the trained network. These two reasons cause
the high loss of the contaminated series.
Further, we use the output loss to plot the receiver operating
characteristic (ROC) curve if use it for detection, shown in
Fig. 10. It shows that the three layer LSTM based PUE attack
detector has the best detection performance, while the single
layer LSTM based detector has the worst performance. It
happens might because the our designed single layer LSTM is
not able to learn the comlex feature with adequate capability,
due to its shallow structure, while basic RNN only learns the
short term features with better performance. The three layer
LSTM detector achieves the optima performance because it is
able to learn complex features as well as to preserve long term
historical behaviors.
Fig. 8. Sample of prediction loss using single layer LSTM in simple PU
activity case.
Fig. 9. Sample of prediction loss using three layer LSTM in simple PU
activity case.
Fig. 10. ROC curve of PUE attack detection in simple PU activity case.
B. Evaluation using a complex PU activity model
In this subsection, we model the PU activity with a more
complex form. The parameters are shown in Table. III. In this
case, the expectation of Ton and Toff can be computed as
4.296 second and 8.23 seconds respectively. We tentatively
used a intermittent spectrum sensing interval Tre = 0.99
second and observation time Tob = 0.01 second for spectrum
sensing. In contaminated PU activity, we also set the attacker
will deploy short impulse PUE attack with probability of 0.3.
Figures 11, 12, and 13 show the loss distribution along
a period time steps. And Fig. 14 shows the ROC curve of
different PUE attack detectors. Similar to the performance on
simple PU activity model, the 3 layer LSTM based PUE attack
detector has the best detection performance, while the single
layer LSTM based detector has the worst performance.
If compare the performance of trained networks working in
two different PU activity models, we will notice that both basic
RNN based approach and single layer LSTM perform worse
in complex PU activity model case (larger loss for normal
series and smaller loss for contaminated series), while the
three layer LSTM performs almost equally well in both cases.
It proves that multi-layer LSTM can learn the complex PU
activity features and utilize historical behaviors, thus performs
better detection on PUE attack.
TABLE III
PARAMETERS FOR COMPLEX PU ACTIVITY MODEL
Hyper-Erlang (ON) Hyper-Erlang (OFF)
p [0.2, 0.05, 0.1, 0.1, 0.2, 0.05, 0.1, 0.03, 0.07, 0.1] [0.1, 0.15, 0.05, 0.15, 0.12, 0.13, 0.08, 0.05, 0.05, 0.12]
k [2, 1, 2, 2, 1, 3, 10, 4, 3, 6] [4, 2, 3, 5, 15, 4, 3, 6, 5, 1]
θ [0.5, 1.2, 0.3, 0.6, 2, 0.8, 1.2, 1.8, 2, 2.5] [2.5, 1.3, 4, 3, 1, 1.5, 1, 0.8, 1.8, 4]
Fig. 11. Sample of prediction loss using basic RNN in complex PU activity
case.
Fig. 12. Sample of prediction loss using single layer LSTM in complex PU
activity case.
Fig. 13. Sample of prediction loss using three layer LSTM in complex PU
activity case.
TABLE IV
AVERAGE LOSS FOR DIFFERENT DETECTOR IN COMPLEX PU ACTIVITY
MODEL
Method Average loss for nor-
mal series
Average loss for con-
taminated series
Basic RNN 0.0301 0.0549
Single layer
LSTM
0.0496 0.0872
Three layer
LSTM
0.0001 0.0478
Fig. 14. ROC curve of PUE attack detection in simple PU activity case.
VI. CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK
This work aims at an effective PUE attack detection scheme.
We first discussed the problem of PUE attack detection fol-
lowing a practical intermittent spectrum sensing approach.
In order to achieve a better PUE attack detection rate on
top of the partial information of the sensing series, a RNN
based detection method is proposed, which is able to exploit
temporal dependency of series for better series prediction and
abnormal activity detection. Further, to overcome the gradient
vanishing problem existing in the basic RNNs, we proposed
a LSTM based detection method that can use longer terms of
series pattern for better performance. Our experimental results
shows that a multi-layer LSTM based PUE attack detector has
achieved a superior performance.
In our experimental study, we tentatively chose some spec-
trum sensing intervals based on the expectation of Ton and
Toff . Although there are reported studies that discussed how
to select an optimal interval to maximize the SUs benefits, it
is advantageous to discuss the optimal sensing interval consid-
ering both SUs propagation as well as anomaly detection. Our
experimental results showed that the single layer LSTM based
detector performs not as good as the multi-layer LSTM based
detector or even the basic RNN. It worthy a trail to develop
more advanced LSTM based detectors. Newer LSTMs such
as peephole LSTM, Gated Recurrent Units (GRU), might gain
more efficiency on learning and show better performance on
detection. Furthermore, we hope our work can be extended to
use in real CRNs. Part of our on-going efforts also include
identifying more real-world scenarios to deploy our proposed
RNN based PUE attack detectors.
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